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Policy Points:
 The Scottish government’s Public Health Supplement (a levy on large
retailers selling alcohol and tobacco) was an innovative tax that was
successful in generating predictable revenues but failed to stimulate
substantial behavioral change among retailers (eg, decisions to stop
selling alcohol or tobacco).
 A tax may be considered a “health” tax on the basis that it raises revenue
for health spending and/or is intended to achieve health aims (eg,
behavioral change among suppliers or consumers of health-damaging
products), but there is likely to be tension between these goals in terms
of policy design.
 Although framing a tax as a “health” measure may increase public
support, where the substantive health content is limited, or question-
able, such a measure may be difficult to sustain in the face of industry
criticism and a lack of competing support from health interests.
Context: In the context of increasing health spending and a constrained budget,
the Scottish government levied a new “health” tax on large retailers selling
alcohol and tobacco in April 2012. This innovative tax, the Public Health
Supplement, had the potential to finance additional health spending while
discouraging retailers from selling tobacco. We present a case study of the levy;
examine how it evolved over time and what impacts it had; explore why, in
2015, the government decided to discontinue the policy; and consider how this
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experience might inform future strategies for addressing tobacco and alcohol
harms via taxes on retailers.
Methods:We employed 3 data sources: (1) policy documents (both documents
in the public domain and documents obtained via Freedom of Information
requests), (2) media coverage of the debates surrounding the Public Health
Supplement, and (3) key informant interviews. We analyzed these data collec-
tively, in chronological order, triangulating between sources.
Findings: When the Supplement was announced in 2011, a clear health ra-
tionale was advanced. However, the policy, as subsequently implemented, was
not designed to elicit a behavioral response from retailers in terms of alcohol or
tobacco sales. It was successful in generating a predictable revenue stream, but
there was no evidence that this was earmarked for health. Hence, the substan-
tive health content of the policy was questionable, a fact that was highlighted
by industry opponents of the tax, while there was also a lack of competing
support from health interests. The industry’s campaign was influential in the
government’s subsequent decision to reduce the rate of the tax and restrict its
duration to 3 years.
Conclusions: A tax may be considered a “health” tax on the basis that it
raises revenue for health spending and/or that it helps achieve health aims (eg,
behavioral change), but there may be tension between these goals in policy
design. Framing a tax as a health measure may increase public support in the
short term, but this may not be sustained if such framing is insufficiently
justified.
Keywords: alcohol, tobacco, taxes, retailers/supermarkets.
I n September 2011, the Scottish government announceda new health tax, the Public Health Supplement (henceforth theSupplement). This tax, which was in place between April 2012
and March 2015, was levied on retail premises in Scotland selling both
alcohol and tobacco that had a ratable value of over £300,000. It was an
innovative tax that, in contrast to traditional tobacco and alcohol excise
taxes, targeted large supermarkets selling alcohol and tobacco products.
As far as we are aware, this was the first tax of its kind.
The Supplement was first announced on September 21, 2011, as part
of the Spending Review 2011 and Draft Budget 2012-13.1 In that
document, the aims were recorded as addressing the health and social
problems associated with alcohol and tobacco use and generating in-
come for “preventive spending.” Three key factors appear to explain the
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Scottish government’s interest in developing this kind of tax. First,
within the United Kingdom, Scotland has a relatively high burden
of smoking- and alcohol-related problems. In economic terms, alcohol
misuse is estimated to cost £3.6 billion a year in Scotland,2 while to-
bacco is estimated to cost £1.1 billion a year.3 In health terms, recent
data suggest that alcohol contributes to approximately 1,000 deaths a
year in Scotland,4 while around 13,000 deaths a year are attributable to
smoking.5 Second, although responsibility for health policy in Scotland
has been devolved since 1998 (following the creation of a new Scottish
Parliament), the Scottish government’s ability to raise revenue via taxa-
tion was limited until further devolution of tax raising powers in 2016.6
The parameters of the Scottish government’s spending plans were set by
UK-level decisions on public spending, a constraint that had become
increasingly salient in the context of Scottish government criticism of
the UK government’s austerity agenda cuts.7 Third, following its “first
mover” status in areas such as smoke-free regulation6 and legislating for
a minimum unit price for alcohol,8 the Scottish government had devel-
oped a reputation as something of a health policy leader in the United
Kingdom.6,9
The Scottish government initially predicted that the levy would raise
£110 million over 3 years. This estimate was subsequently revised down
to £95million over 3 years. In 2015, for reasons that were notmade clear,
the Scottish government decided not to continue the levy into the next
3-year budgeting period. No formal evaluation of the Supplement has
been undertaken. Indeed, as far as we are aware, this paper presents the
first analysis of this notable measure, using a case study approach to ex-
amine the process through which the policy was developed, its evolution
over the period in which it was implemented, the resulting outcomes,
and the subsequent decision to discontinue the policy. Drawing on this
case study, we consider how these experiences can inform future strate-
gies for policymakers and advocates interested in addressing tobacco and
harmful alcohol through new taxes on retailers.
Methods
We employed a qualitative case study approach, drawing on 3 key
data sources (relevant documents, media coverage and key informant
interviews), triangulating the results across these sources. For the
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documentary analysis, we began by searching the Scottish government
and Scottish Parliament websites for documents concerning the Sup-
plement. The most relevant sources of information from these searches
were downloaded and saved for analysis. We also submitted a Freedom
of Information request to the Scottish government to access information
on the nature and extent of government–industry interactions in the
period between the Supplement being announced in September 2011
and the statement of the finalized policy in February 2012. In addition,
we searched the Internet more widely to try to identify documents re-
lating to the Supplement produced by interested stakeholders, focusing
on those produced by large retailers. We also searched for documents
cited in media reports that appeared to be of interest and asked all in-
terviewees to let us know about any potentially useful documents. We
analyzed the resulting documents collectively, in chronological order,
to ascertain which actors were involved in discussions about the Sup-
plement, to understand the details of this policy’s development, and to
assess how discussions about the Supplement changed over time. Box 1
identifies the key documents included in our analysis.
Box 1. Key Documents Included in Our Analysis
 Scottish Spending Review 2011 and Draft Budget 2012-13
 Budget Speech by Finance Minister John Swinney, 2012
 Oral and Written Answers to Oral and Written Questions in
the Scottish Parliament
 Information received via Freedom of Information request,
including emails and letters between the Scottish govern-
ment and Tesco, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI
Scotland), and the Scottish Retail Consortium regarding the
Public Health Supplement, along with minutes of related
meetings
 Information related to meetings between the Scottish govern-
ment and other policy actors in the public domain
 Reports of Scottish Parliament scrutiny of the 2011 Spending
Review and 2012-13 Draft Budget
 Oral and Written Evidence to Scottish Parliamentary Com-
mittee inquiries and
 Regulations and Executive Note for the Public Health
Supplement
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Wewere not able to obtain copies of all of the documents we identified
as relevant, which was a limitation. One important document we were
not able to obtain was a report produced by the Centre for Economics
and Business Research (CEBR), a consultancy organization, on behalf of
Asda, one of the large supermarket chains affected by the Supplement.
The report was widely referred to in media coverage of the Supplement
and was drawn on by large retailers in their efforts tomobilize against the
Supplement. In our efforts to obtain a copy of the report, we submitted
requests to both Asda and CEBR, asked interviewees whom we knew
had seen the report, and queried journalists who had written articles that
cited the report, but none of these routes proved successful. The media
coverage of this report provided us with information about the report’s
contents but, without the full report, we were not able to analyze specific
claims made in this document in any detail.
At the same time, we undertook searches for relevant media articles
in two databases: Factiva and ProQuest (specifically the ABI/INFORM
Complete and ISSB databases). These databases were selected (following
discussionswith a qualified librarian) for their breadth ofmedia coverage,
both geographically and in terms of the types of media suggested (ie,
including trade journals and other specialist media). After undertaking
an initial analysis, we developed search strings (outlined in Box 2) that
included the various phrases we identified as being used to describe the
Supplement in media discussions and combined these with “Scotland,”
our geographical focus, which helped exclude nonrelevant articles.
Box 2. Media Analysis Search Strings
Dates of Search: July 10, 2015, to July 15, 2015
Database: Factiva
Search String: (“public health levy” OR “public health tax” OR
“public health supplement” OR “large retailer’s tax” OR “large re-
tailer’s levy” OR “Tesco tax” OR “supermarket tax”) AND Scotland
Filter: 2010-2015
Database: ProQuest (ABI/INFORM Complete and ISSB)
Search string: (“public health levy” OR “public health tax” OR
“public health supplement” OR “large retailer’s levy” OR “supermar-
ket tax” OR “Tesco tax”) AND Scotland
Filter: Exclude scholarly journals
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The media searches were conducted in July 2015 (ie, several months
after the Public Health Supplement was discontinued). The combined
results were screened for relevance and the relevant articles (n = 151)
were then analyzed thematically, using a data extraction table that fo-
cused on identifying (1) which actors were involved in debates about the
Supplement, and (2) the main claims and arguments put forward about
the Supplement.
Using the results of the documentary and media analysis, we then
identified a list of potential interviewees. We subsequently asked all
interviewees to identify other potentially relevant interviewees. In total,
we approached 32 individuals with a request for an interview, of which
only 9 agreed to participate. This is a relatively low response rate, but is
reflective of the fact that, as shown below, the Supplement was conceived
and designed by a small number of individuals working within the
finance directorate of the Scottish government, and many of the actors
we had anticipated would have a view on the Supplement did not feel
that they had engaged with the policy sufficiently to be able to provide a
useful interview. (This was the reason given for declining our interview
request by individuals at NHS Health Scotland, local authorities, and
health-focused nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], as well as
several opposition members of the Scottish Parliament [MSPs]). Indeed,
2 of the health-focused NGOs we contacted stated that they did not
view the Supplement as a public health measure (something we discuss
in more detail later in the paper). Others—especially the large retailers,
Scottish National Party (SNP) MSPs, ministers, and special advisers
we approached—tended either not to reply or to say that they did not
have time for an interview on this topic. A summary of the professional
location of potential and actual interviewees is provided in Table 1.
Interviews were undertaken by one or both of the lead authors (wher-
ever possible, we undertook interviews jointly but the limited availabil-
ity of some intervieweesmeant that we had to conduct 4 of the interviews
on an individual basis). All interviews were digitally recorded and pro-
fessionally transcribed, with the written consent of interviewees. The one
exception to this was the interview with an NHS Health Scotland staff
member due to the extremely short interview length and the informant’s
lack of specific knowledge about the Supplement; summary notes were
therefore deemed more appropriate. Interview transcripts were uploaded
to NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software program, where they were
thematically coded using a coding framework that reflected our primary
806 M. Hellowell, K.E. Smith, and A. Wright
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interests (ie, to understand the rationale for implementing, and later
discontinuing, the Public Health Supplement and to identify the key
actors and arguments involved in debates about the measure).
To contextualize the specific findings of this project, we undertook
2 linked systematic searches for relevant literature concerning health
taxes, focusing on (1) taxes intended to change the costs of supplying
or consuming health-damaging products and (2) taxes intended to be
hypothecated for health-related objectives. We discuss the results of
these literature searches in more detail elsewhere.10,11 In the context of
the current paper, it is sufficient to note that we were unable to identify
any similar taxes on retailers of tobacco and alcohol, suggesting that the
Supplement represents an innovative health policy, and that this analysis
is therefore an important opportunity to reflect on the lessons that might
be learned from this novel form of taxation.
Results
How Was the Public Health Supplement
Perceived by Key Stakeholders?
The stated aims of the Supplement when it was announced on September
21, 2011, were to address “the health and social problems associated with
alcohol and tobacco use” and to generate income for preventive-spending
measures.1 Our media analysis shows that the policy was initially wel-
comed by public health NGOs, which tended to regard it as a means
of reducing the supply of alcohol and tobacco while raising revenue for
health spending:
Scotland has again shown leadership in acting to curb the harm from this
lethal and addictive product and to invest in our health. —ASH Scotland12
In contrast, our interview data show that retail-sector representatives
viewed the Supplement as no more than a relabeled form of an earlier
attempt to increase tax revenues from large retailers—a measure that
had not contained any explicit public health content or framing:
In the previous Parliament they had brought forward a proposal [ . . . ] for
a larger retailers levy [ . . . ] but there was no linkage at all in name or
otherwise to public health, booze, tobacco or anything like that. There were
several different reasons given at the time. One was to tilt the balance in
Scotland’s Innovative Health Tax 809
favor of smaller retailers, [ . . . ] others it was about out-of-town retailers.
[ . . . ] And obviously ultimately they lost that vote. And then in subsequent
Parliament when they got a majority, it miraculously became something to do
with health. —Interviewee from the retail sector
From this perspective, the Supplement was seen as no more than a
means of raising additional revenue in order to address a financing gap
in the Spending Review, which, as noted, was written in a context in
which the block grant awarded to Scotland by the United Kingdom was
being reduced, in real terms, for the first time since devolution.13 Our
interview data show that, over time, the perception that the Supplement
was largely a revenue-raising measure and had no substantive public
health content became dominant across all policy stakeholders.
In accordance with this interpretation, it is notable that health-
related actors were not included in discussions about the policy’s
development, even within the Scottish government. An interviewee
from the Scottish government health directorate stated that the
Supplement was primarily developed within the finance directorate.
In addition, documents show that NHS Health Scotland—the national
health agency tasked with improving health in the country—was
not consulted in the development of the Supplement,14 and our
attempts to interview individuals working at NHS Health Scotland
confirmed this. Similarly, an employee of a public health NGO that we
interviewed said they had not been consulted on the policy and had had
no “advance warning” of it before its announcement in the Spending
Review.
Perhaps as a consequence of this, other interviewees suggested that
there was no strong lobby in favor of the Supplement, with one opposi-
tion MSP reflecting that this was surprising, “if it was a genuine health
Supplement.”
How Did Large Retailers Respond to the
Supplement?
The announcement of the Supplement elicited an intense and sustained
response from large retailers that sell alcohol and tobacco (ie, Asda,
the Co-operative Group, Morrison’s, Sainsbury’s, and Tesco) and their
representative bodies. Responses included (1) oral and written responses
to Scottish Parliament committees; (2) direct lobbying of John Swinney,
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Figure 1. Comparing the Number of Positive, Negative, and Neu-
tral Views on the Public Health Supplement by Individual Quotations
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the then financeminister, and his officials, particularly during the period
from the draft budget’s publication on September 9, 2011, to the final
budget speech on February 8, 2011; and (3) direct lobbying of the health
directorate—even though, as outlined above, it was not a key player in
developing the policy. The industry also engaged in a sustained campaign
in the media, in which quotations that were critical of the Supplement
were prominent (Figure 1).
As Figure 2 illustrates, there was a large increase in media cover-
age of the Supplement in the initial days and months following the
announcement. The number of relevant media articles then decreased
significantly over the next 4 years and, notably, did not peak in the
run-up to the announcement to discontinue the Supplement, suggest-
ing that most of the public lobbying undertaken in relation to the
Supplement occurred immediately after the measure was announced and
before the details of the measure were confirmed. Between 2013 and
Scotland’s Innovative Health Tax 811
Figure 2. Number of News Articles Concerning the Public Health
Supplement, by Year
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2015, the small number of media articles published appeared almost ex-
clusively in newspapers, with only one article in a retail trade magazine
published in 2013, which suggests that, although efforts to gain media
attention were limited in this period, they remained outward facing.
Taken together, our data sources identify 8 distinct arguments em-
ployed against the Supplement, as summarized in Table 2. The frequency
with which specific arguments were deployed, and their use across dif-
ferent sectors, varied. In the following subsections, we explain each of
the arguments against the Supplement in detail.
In a November 24, 2011, letter to John Swinney, obtained via a
Freedom of Information request, CBI Scotland claimed the Supplement
would “reduce rates of return and make it more expensive for retail to
invest in Scotland than elsewhere in the United Kingdom or indeed
abroad.”15 Asda commissioned CEBR to produce a report on the likely
impacts of the Supplement, focusing on negative economic impacts. (It
is perhaps worth noting that CEBR had previously been commissioned
by the alcohol producer SABMiller to produce a report that critically as-
sessed the economicmodeling undertaken by academics at theUniversity
812 M. Hellowell, K.E. Smith, and A. Wright
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of Sheffield, which was being used to support Scottish government plans
for minimum unit pricing for alcohol.16) The CEBR report focusing on
the Supplement (which we have been unable to obtain, despite written
requests to Asda and CEBR, among other organizations) was employed
by the large retail sector in subsequent lobbying efforts, and its findings
were summarized in some of the media coverage. From this coverage, it
appears that the Supplement was framed in this report as an “econom-
ically irrational tool,” and estimates were put forward that the affected
retailers would lose 8%-10% of their profits.17
The interview data suggest that the predictions of negative economic
impacts set out in the CEBR report were subsequently drawn on by large
retailers and their representative groups in direct lobbying activities.
One interviewee from a large retailer (not Asda) stated:
You have to look at the effect [of the Supplement] on the profitability of
particular stores, and profitability is the reason that investors decide where
to put their money and where to invest, and the evidence [from the Asda-
commissioned CEBR report] suggested that the impact on store profitability
was something like 10% of store operations, a store operation’s profit, or 10%
of the particular company’s profitability across a group of stores. Now that is a
massive impact compared with other places that people or companies could invest.
And there were concerns about the impact, what message that sent to investors.
Claiming that the Supplement would have negative economic impacts
was also the most frequently employed argument against the policy in
themedia coverage. For example, as the above quotation hints, opponents
argued that the Supplement would be a disincentive for investment by
large retailers in Scotland, slowing their rate of expansion, and that it
would harm their ability to sustain their contributions to the economy
by providing jobs. Overall, the Supplement was positioned as directly
counterproductive to the Scottish government’s overarching economic
goals. These goals were articulated in a foreward to the spending review,
authored by then finance minister Swinney, as “accelerating economic
recovery to create the jobs that our people need.”1
The lack of public health substance to the Supplement was also a
major theme in the attempts of large retailers to lobby against it. In
a November 8, 2011, letter to the Scottish government—which we
obtained via a request made under the Freedom of Information Act—
jointly written by the Scottish Retail Consortium (SRC), CBI Scotland,
the Wine and Spirit Trade Association, and the Scottish Chambers of
Commerce, these trade representatives argued:
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The link between the levy and preventative health measures is tenuous. [ . . . ]
There must be robust evidence that the levy will fund measurable, well-defined
and evidence-based preventative health measures.18
This was also a major theme in media coverage. For example:
The Scottish government has a hole in its local authority budget and has chosen
the retail sector to fill it, simply because supermarkets are profitable businesses.
The public-health justification for this levy is completely unfounded. —Jane
Bevis, SRC communications director, October 18, 201119
The claims by opponents of the levy also highlighted the lack of a
commitment to ring-fencing the revenue raised through the levy for
public health purposes:
A true health measure would be properly evidence-based, would not discrimi-
nate in this arbitrary way, and the revenue would be ring-fenced for health
purposes. —SRC spokesperson, October 5, 201120
Our analysis suggests that in addition to threats about investment and
the economy, opponents also argued that the levy was discriminatory on
the basis that it targeted only one part of one sector and that it could
easily be extended to others:
This levy still sets an alarming precedent by singling out one part
of one sector, and businesses of all kinds will fear what future
revenue-raising schemes might be devised. —Ian Shearer, SRC director,
February 8, 201221
There were 3 elements to this argument as presented by large retailers
in the media coverage. One was to question the health basis of the
Supplement’s exclusive focus on larger retailers, given that many people
purchase tobacco and alcohol products from smaller retailers. Another
was to suggest that the Supplement potentially set a precedent for other
sectors (an argument that appears to have been intended to quash any
policy support from smaller retailers, as discussed in more detail below).
A third was to claim that large retailers had a good reputation in the area
of alcohol and tobacco sales, as well as participation in health-related
initiatives, and that the Supplement undermined these efforts. In the
Scottish government itself, there was some sympathy with this latter
argument. For example, the official we interviewed from the Scottish
government health directorate indicated that the Supplement featured
in public health–related conversations between the Scottish government
and large retailers, with large retailers presenting the Supplement as
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simply displacing custom for tobacco and alcohol from large retailers
to smaller retailers. Without any evaluation of the actual impacts on
trade and consumption, this interviewee reflected that there had been
no evidence-base to assess this claim or enable the Scottish government
to respond with a public health argument.
Efforts were also made to position large supermarkets as “vulnerable”
entities that were being victimized by the levy and to suggest that this
would lead to increased prices for consumers.22
There were also a set of arguments against the Supplement that related
to the process via which the policy had been developed (arguments 4
and 6 in Table 2); because of its alleged economic effects, large retailers
and their lobbyists argued, in the media, documents, and interviews (see
Table 2) that the Supplement should have been subject to a Business
Regulatory Impact Assessment (a tool to help policymakers consider
the impacts of policy proposals on economic actors) and to far greater
consultation. For example:
Well there’s a whole set of principles, core regulation principles. And clearly
if you’re going to do a major policy like that, then you should do some
evidence beforehand, you should do some research, some assessment of what
the costs and benefits would be. And there was no regulatory assessment
at all, and the Scottish Government specifically said it wasn’t going to do
one, which completely contradicted all the guidelines about better regulation.
—Interviewee from the retail sector
The strong and frequent emphasis that business actors placed on “bet-
ter regulation” guidelines and the need for a business impact assessment
is interesting in the context of research demonstrating business (in-
cluding tobacco company) involvement in shaping and promoting the
better regulation agenda23 and impact assessment tools in the United
Kingdom and the European Union.24
In addition, in the aforementioned November 8, 2011, letter from
the SRC, CBI Scotland, the Wine and Spirit Trade Association, and
the Scottish Chambers of Commerce to the Scottish government, the
trade bodies argued that the Supplement was “a completely new form
of taxation” for large retailers and business in general and required
close scrutiny as such.18 In the weeks following the announcement of
the Supplement, as it became clear that the Scottish government did
not intend to carry out a Business Regulatory Impact Assessment on
the Supplement, this became a major focus of media stories about the
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Supplement and was linked to the idea (briefly mentioned above) that
the policy might, at any moment, be expanded to other sectors:
Nowonder business suspects a hidden agenda on business rates—what the SNP
are doing to supermarkets today they may well be doing to other businesses to-
morrow.—Lewis MacDonald, Labour Party infrastructure spokesman,
October 18, 201125
Our data suggest that the alleged potential for the Supplement to cre-
ate a “worrying precedent” for other forms of business taxation served to
widen industry opposition to the measure. Media coverage suggests that,
initially, representatives of smaller retailers supported the Supplement.
Both the Federation of Small Businesses and the Glasgow Chamber of
Commerce were reported to be supportive.19,26 However, interviewees
from large retailers described how small retailers were encouraged to
change their view. For example:
There was a bit of [support for the Supplement from smaller retail businesses]
until it was pointed out [to] some of them: the levy applies today to one group,
and the ratable value threshold could quite easily be lowered more particularly
if the minister needed some more money in the following year. And that is
actually, instead of just, when they were slightly enlightened as to looking
at horizon scanning and looking forward a little bit and started to realize
actually it might not be such a good thing, they began to change their tune.
—Interviewee from the retail sector
It is clear from the intensity of the industry’s response evident in the
documents we obtained via Freedom of Information requests, the media
coverage of the Supplement, and the comments made in interviews,
that large retailers had not expected anything similar to the previous
large retailer levy to emerge. The lack of consultation was felt to be
particularly damaging in the area of tax policy:
For tax policy, you should do the evidence beforehand, and you should produce
the consultations and explain what the policy is trying to do, and then you
should consult tax professionals and other people about how a tax is best
designed, and then you should draft some legislation and then consult on that.
And that’s standard policymaking inside government. —interviewee from
the retail sector
This argument was also apparent in the initial media coverage of the
Supplement, with retailers and their trade group representatives express-
ing their concern over the lack of consultation, especially in the context
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of Scottish government commitments to working in “partnership” with
the business community:
It’s difficult to work in partnership with somebody who keeps bringing surprises
with very large bills attached to them . . . . There is an awful lot of missing
detail at the moment. We want to understand what the consultation process is
going to be given that there was nothing up until now. —Jane Bevis, SRC
communications director27
Both the documentary data and the interviews we undertook indicate
that themain actors lobbying against the Supplement were large retailers
and the trade groups representing their interests. None of the individuals
we interviewed suggested that tobacco or alcoholmanufacturers had been
active on this issue. However, we did identify evidence that parts of the
tobacco industry may have been considering a legal challenge to the
policy.
On March 12, 2012, Gallaher Limited (now part of Japan Tobacco
International) wrote to Scottish ministers requesting they disclose (1)
any “assessment, consideration, or discussion” of the legality of the
Supplement in terms of the competence of the Scottish government un-
der the Scotland Act 1998; (2) its effect on competition and/or trade
in the European Union; and (3) why the European Commission was
not notified about the Supplement.28 Scottish ministers responded on
March 30, 2012, informing Gallaher that they were withholding the
information requested, citing a number of exemptions in Freedom of
Information legislation.28 Gallaher appealed the government’s decision
to the Scottish information commissioner but the appeal was ultimately
unsuccessful.28 None of the individuals we interviewed said they were
aware of tobacco industry lobbying about the Supplement or of a poten-
tial legal challenge.
Changes to the Supplement Between
Announcement and Implementation
In the period between the initial announcement of the Supplement and
the confirmation of its inclusion in the final budget in April 2012, the
technical content of the policy and its framing changed in important
ways. Specifically, changes were made to (1) the public health rationale,
which was progressively de-emphasized by the Scottish government;
(2) the rate at which the tax would be paid, and therefore the predicted
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revenue from it; and (3) the period of time in which the Supplement
would remain in place. In this section, we explain these 3 changes in
more detail and comment on the extent to which they are connected
to the strong, negative responses of large retailers following the policy’s
initial announcement.
The presentation by the Scottish government of the rationale for the
Supplement changed between the initial announcement and its imple-
mentation. This is reflected in emails and letters between the Scottish
government and 3 key industry actors—Tesco, CBI Scotland, and the
SRC (the latter 2 are the main trade groups that represented large re-
tailers in these debates)—as well as Scottish government minutes of
meetings with these and other industry actors, which were obtained
through Freedom of Information requests.29,30 These documents reveal
that, in a meeting on October 17, 2011, with the trade groups in addi-
tion to executives from Asda, Morrison’s, the Co-operative Group, and
Tesco, Swinney is recorded as stating: “The levy is not an attempt to
limit sales or to force retailers to cease sale of these goods, but is to
establish a new funding stream to support the long-term sustainability
of public services.”29
In a meeting with executives of Tesco on November 10, 2011, Swin-
ney once again emphasized the focus on income generation via the
Supplement, stating (according to minutes of that meeting drafted
by officials) that “the Scottish government [is] willing to work with
Tesco to consider any alternative suggestions for income generation.”
This echoed comments he made earlier that day during his visit to a
new Shettleston Tesco store and his commitment to meet again with
Tesco.30
We know from emails between Scottish government officials and
Tesco that the latter followed up on this offer and produced a report
(which we have not been able to obtain) with a proposal to expand the
scope of the tax to include a wider range of large businesses. In a letter
from Swinney toDavidNorth of Tesco on February 8, 2012 (themorning
before the budget speech in which the details of Supplement were con-
firmed), he thanked the company for the “constructive dialogue” over the
Supplement and for the “alternative proposals” that Tesco had suggested.
He added: “While I have not pursued these in full, I have given them full
consideration and some elements of your suggestions have been taken on
board.”31
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He then confirmed that the details of the Supplement would be
confirmed in parliament that afternoon, including “some changes to our
original proposals,” stating:
Having reflected upon your comments and within the constraints of delivering
a balanced budget, I have reduced the original amount paid by individual
retailers and limited the length of time that the Supplement will apply. This
will have the overall effect that the estimated income generated by the Public
Health Supplement will reduce by £15 million, to £95 million, over the 3-year
period to 2015. This will be raised by setting a fixed rate Supplement of 9.3
pence in 2012-13 and 13 pence in 2013 and 2014-15. [ . . . ] In addition,
I can confirm that the Public Health Supplement will be a temporary measure
and will apply for the 3 years of the Spending Review only, from 2012-13
to 2014-15. . . . I hope these measures will go some way to alleviating the
concerns expressed by the retail sector about future investment and that we will
continue to work together constructively in future.31
To summarize, the documents relating to this period suggest that the
“public health” framing of the Supplement, and the spending inten-
tions regarding the revenue to be accrued through this initiative, began
to shift as a direct result of the lobbying and scrutiny of large retail-
ers. Policymakers moved away from any clear commitment to pursuing
public health goals via the supplement, or hypothecating the revenues
for public health, and increasingly emphasized a far less specific connec-
tion between the Supplement and agreements with local authorities to
increase preventive spending.
Assessing the Impacts of the Public
Health Supplement
Contribution to Public Sector Spending
(and Public Health Spending in Particular)
Given that the rationale for the Supplement was, ultimately, to raise
revenue, it is important to note that in this respect the policy was
successful: the revenues received by public authorities in Scotland were
in line with the (revised, post-budget) estimates. The measure raised
£95.9 million over its 3-year duration—£0.9 million higher than the
amount anticipatedwhen the policywas introduced (author constituency
MSP, personal email communication, February 9, 2015). However, the
Scottish government has not provided detail of how this money was
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spent, stating: “The estimated additional income was factored into the
total resources available in the Spending Review 2011 and contributed
to the preventative spend measures introduced at that time.”32
Several interviewees expressed the view that the Supplement was
designed in such a way that it was uneconomic for large retailers to
avoid—and hence the scale of the revenues to be received could be
predicted with accuracy. Indeed, interviewees noted that it was precisely
because avoiding the Supplement was so difficult that behavior change
among retailers (ie, opting not to sell tobacco or alcohol) was unlikely to
occur. (It is apparent that, if it does not make economic sense to avoid a
tax, in this case by ceasing to sell alcohol or tobacco, then a rational [ie,
profit-maximizing] retailer will not do so.)
Although many of the interviewees claimed that tobacco was not
particularly profitable for retailers, they also suggested it was profitable
enough to continue selling despite the Supplement and independently
of the so-called footfall effect:
We modeled it. We looked and said there are [X affected] stores . . . . [T]he
analysis was done on the level of tobacco sales in each store, and even looking
at the tobacco sales and the cost it was still worth our while to sell the tobacco,
even before you take into account the value of tobacco to us as a driver of
footfall. So we looked at it and yeah, it was a no-brainer to be honest, carry
on doing what we were doing. —Interviewee from a large retailer
This suggests that, if a similar policy were ever intended to encourage
retailers to stop selling tobacco (or alcohol), it would need to be set at a
substantially higher level.
In terms of the policy’s link to preventive public health spending,
we could find no evidence of hypothecation. This reflects, in part, a
general difficulty of tracing the relationship between specific sources
of government revenue and spending on specific activities. However,
in this case, it appears that the relationship was particularly indi-
rect. A civil servant in the Scottish Government with experience of
working in finance reflected that, despite the supplement’s name, the
revenue was not exclusively hypothecated to public health spending,
and that its name was reflective more of the tax base for the supple-
ment (ie, large retailers of both tobacco and alcohol) than any associated
spending.
The picture is further complicated by the fact that the money was
raised, not by the Scottish government, but by local authorities in
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Scotland. Further, local authorities were expected, alongside central
government and the National Health Service, to contribute to a £500
million shift to preventive spending, including through 3 so-called
change funds—one focusing on early years, one on reducing reoffend-
ing, and one on older people’s care.1 It could be argued that some of these
funds relate to the social determinants of health, and that consequently
some of the revenue generated by the Supplement may have been spent
on public health–related activities. However, due to the “fungibility” of
money33 (ie, the fact that any unit of money is substitutable for another),
it is difficult to trace the flow between this specific income stream and
the change funds: thus, an increase in funding from the Supplement may
have been offset by a reduction in other forms of funding by local au-
thorities and central government funding of local authorities. In either
case, this would, in effect, mean that there had not been any net increase
in the resources available for public health.
Broader Economic Impacts
The broader economic impacts of the Supplement are even harder to
assess, especially in a context in which the large supermarkets were
already beginning to change their investment patterns in Scotland. This
change was partly a response to challenges from changing economic
circumstances, competition from cheaper supermarkets, such as Aldi and
Lidl (which were unaffected by the Supplement as neither sell tobacco),
and the move to online retail. As a senior policymaker in the Scottish
government’s health directorate reflected:
What [large retailers] would claim was, “when we are looking at [a] way to
invest in stores, we do the maths, and actually [the Supplement] might not look
[like] very much but our margins are so low so we might choose to open a store
somewhere elsewhere.[ . . . ]” Did I ever fully believe those things? It struck me
as unlikely that that margin in itself was likely to be absolutely instrumental
to many decisions whether or not to proceed with a store or not . . . .
This and other data suggest that, although the Scottish government
decided to reduce the level of the Supplement and restrict its imple-
mentation to 3 years (as described above), this decision does not appear
to have been taken on the basis that Scottish government officials were
persuaded by arguments about the negative economic impacts of the
Supplement and was more likely a reflection of a desire to recover the
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broader relationship between the government and large retailers (as dis-
cussed in more detail later).
Public Health Impacts
The Scottish government was asked by the Economy, Energy and
Tourism Committee, in a report published on October 9, 2011, to
“monitor the impact of the levy on sales of the targeted products, and to
report back to Parliament within 18 months on the effectiveness of the
measures in terms of (a) public health, (b) revenue generation, and (c)
employment in the retail sector.”34 Just over a month later, in a letter
to the SRC, dated November 15, 2011 (obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act), Swinney stated: “Robust mechanisms for measuring
effectiveness [of the Supplement] will be developed and implemented
by the Scottish government in consultation with its stakeholders.”35
We were, however, unable to find any evidence of such reporting. The
clerk of the committee confirmed to us that no action had been taken
by the committee to follow up on its request (Douglas Wands, email
communication, February 9, 2015).
Nonetheless, the media analysis we undertook confirmed that one
large supermarket company, Sainsbury’s, decided to stop selling tobacco
for a period of time in a small number of stores and that the company
presented this as a response to the Supplement:
[T]he impact of the levy introduced by the Scottish government has led us to
undertake a review of the sale of tobacco in our Scottish stores. Earlier this
year we removed tobacco from 3 of our Scottish supermarkets and 1 convenience
store. This trial has been extended to a further 6 supermarkets.—Sainsbury’s
spokesperson, November 11, 201236
The extent to which the impetus for Sainsbury’s decision to
stop selling tobacco in 10 stores really lay with the Supplement is,
however, unclear. Industry interviewees expressed skepticism about the
stated rationale for this decision. One interviewee from a competitor
supermarket company claimed that several of the chosen stores were
large, out-of-town premises that also had a separate filling station in
which tobacco continued to be sold, but that was small enough not to
be subject to the Supplement:
So what [Sainsbury’s] did is they stopped selling tobacco in their stores, so
their supermarket, but they continued selling tobacco in the kiosk. So when
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people drove out to the petrol station, filled up their car, they could buy the
tobacco there. But because the petrol station and your store are two separate
entities in terms of ratable value, so Sainsbury’s, people say that’s an example
of, that was a really good, shows what can be achieved—it achieved nothing.
Sainsbury’s representatives did not agree to be interviewed by us about
the Supplement and their response to it.
The Scottish Government’s Credibility, and
Relationship, with the Business Community
According to most of our interviewees, one clear impact of the Supple-
ment was damage to the relationship between the Scottish government
and the business community (or, at least, the affected retailers):
It harmed the credibility of the Scottish government with the large retail-
ers.[ . . . ] I don’t know about other sectors but with food retailers we feel the
relationship is not particularly cooperative. Compared to the relationship, say,
with Westminster, [which] is far more engaging and, if you think about the
public health responsibility deal, there are critics [ . . . ] [but] what that has
achieved is that there is an on-going dialogue between business and the De-
partment of Health about how best to move things forward.[ . . . ] Things are
done to retailers in Scotland, whereas inWestminster it’s more collaborative.—
Interviewee from a large retailer [interviewee’s emphasis]
Although it is hard to provide a definitive account of why, in 2014, the
Scottish government decided to announce that the Supplement would
not be continued beyond the initial 3-year period, some interviewees
suggested that this decision reflected a perceived need by the Scottish
government to improve the relationship with the business community
in the context of the 2014 referendum for Scottish independence:
I would love to tell you it was my fantastic lobbying. I would love to tell you
that he’d heard all the arguments, [but] I think the independence referendum
had a huge bearing on it, because it did not fit with [the] narrative that in
Scotland we’d have a low corporate tax regime. And that was the big message
they were playing at that particular juncture, and they went, This doesn’t
sit, this is going to be a bit of an Achilles’ heel when we come out and talk
about independent Scotland cutting corporation tax. What about, “You just
increased it £95 million on these other guys”? It didn’t sit well, so I think
this was a general clearing of the decks ahead of the referendum. So great,
huge benefits [of] having the referendum. —Interviewee from the retail
sector
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Discussion
When the Public Health Supplement was first announced in the Spend-
ing Review 2011 and Draft Budget 2012-13, a clear public health
rationale for this new tax was advanced: to reduce the economic desir-
ability for large retailers of selling alcohol and tobacco products and
increase revenues for preventive health spending. This was also how the
Supplement was understood in the public health community, at least
initially. In practice, our analysis suggests the Supplement was not de-
signed in such a way as to stimulate behavioral change among retailers,
and that the revenues were not hypothecated for health, but used to
address a gap in the Scottish government’s Spending Review proposals.
It could therefore be argued (as many of our interviewees did argue) that
the presentation of the Supplement as a “public health” measure was
misleading.
After the announcement of the Supplement, large retailers mobi-
lized to lobby against it—through campaigns in the media, Parliament,
and direct lobbying of Scottish government ministers and officials.
Although some public health–focused NGOs welcomed the measure
with brief comments in early media coverage, the absence of genuine
health content in the Supplement diminished the involvement of pub-
lic health advocates, resulting in no sustained attempt to balance the
industry’s criticism. The lobbying efforts focused on the period be-
tween the announcement of the Supplement in September 2011 and its
implementation in April 2012, at the end of which major concessions
were made by the Scottish government to the industry—including a
decision to reduce the tax take from the measure and limit its duration
to a 3-year period. This appears to have been a direct result of what
Swinney labeled the “constructive dialogue” initiated via the lobbying
campaign.31
In this regard, the experience of the Public Health Supplement in
Scotland shares some similarities with Denmark’s short-lived “fat tax.”
Both measures were met with strong opposition from the commercial
sector and in neither case was this opposition countered by support from
public health interests.37,38 In both cases, the result was a decision not
to continue the tax, despite the fact that both could, by some measures,
be considered “successful” (the Supplement successfully raised revenue,
and the Danish fat tax contributed to reducing the consumption of
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saturated fat, which was its primary aim38). In April 2012, the revenue
to be generated by the Supplement was forecast at £95 million. In prac-
tice, the amount raised was £95.9 million. The accuracy of the forecast
highlights the fact that the tax rate was set at a level that supermarkets
would be unlikely to seek to avoid (ie, by ceasing to sell alcohol or
tobacco) in the context of the profits earned from such sales. For the
same reasons, the Supplement was unlikely to change behavior vis-a`-vis
retailers’ decision to sell alcohol and tobacco. Consistent with this, we
did not identify any evidence to suggest that alcohol or tobacco manu-
facturers were involved in lobbying against the Supplement. However,
we did identify evidence to suggest at least one major tobacco manu-
facturer, Gallaher Limited (now part of Japan Tobacco International),
was considering a legal challenge to the policy. This may indicate that a
policy that was more directly targeted at trying to achieve retail behavior
change with regard to tobacco sales could face legal challenges from this
sector.
Given the predictability of the revenue raised through the Supple-
ment, it would have been possible for the Scottish government to develop
clear spending proposals, to be funded through this new measure.
However, as outlined above, our findings indicate that the Supplement
was used to address a gap in the Scottish government’s budget rather
than to fund any specific set of activities or services. Since these spending
plans were already focusing on a shift toward preventive spending, it is
plausible that the Supplement helped to support this shift (which is the
way one of the Scottish government officials we interviewed framed the
outcomes from spending). It is clear, however, that the revenue raised
from the Supplement was not meaningfully hypothecated—and indeed
it seems likely that there was never any intention to formally hypoth-
ecate for health purposes the revenue the Supplement was projected to
raise.
In this regard, there are similarities between the experience of the Sup-
plement and many other health taxes that have been initially presented
as measures that will raise revenue for spending on particular activities.
A systematic review of tobacco industry interests in tobacco taxation
has, for example, identified several examples of tobacco tax increases
where initial promises of hypothecation for particular purposes were
not implemented as planned, with funds often being diverted to other
objectives.10 This provided tobacco industry interests with an additional
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argument against hypothecated tax increases.10 Although it would not
be fair to suggest that Scottish government officials ever made a clear
statement of their intent to hypothecate the revenue to public health
purposes, the initial framing of the measure implied this would occur,
and the failure to do so left the tax with limited support within the
public health community.
Our evaluation of the Supplement provides a number of lessons for
policy actors who are considering developing, or advocating for, future
“health” taxes. The Supplement, as a tax on large retailers selling alcohol
and tobacco products, was innovative and, from a health point of view,
had some valuable attributes. While it was opposed by large retailers,
there does not appear to have been any notable public opposition to
the measure. It raised a very predictable revenue stream for the Scottish
government, which could have been channeled to serve health objectives
(even if, in this particular case, this did not occur). On the other hand,
while health taxes on particular products are often intended to stimulate
behavior change, this was not the intention of the Supplement and, in-
deed, there does not appear to have been any sustainable behavior change
among retailers. Our findings highlight a possible tension between the
use of taxes to achieve, on the one hand, revenue objectives (which may
or may not be health-related), and, on the other, public health objectives
related to product supply and demand. It is plausible that a similar
measure, with a higher tax rate, could be effective in encouraging re-
tailers to stop selling tobacco products, though the predictability of the
revenue stream would necessarily diminish. To ascertain at what rate
such a measure would need to be set would require detailed scenario
modeling.
In addition, it is possible that the extent of behavior change
would have been greater had the measure been extended to smaller
retailers—though, in this case, it is also possible that the measure would
have faced stronger, and broader, opposition. (It is perhaps worth noting
that, at the same time Scotland implemented the Public Health Sup-
plement, the Northern Ireland Executive chose to introduce a tax on
larger retailers, without any “health” focus, and positioned this as part
of a smaller business agenda.39) It also seems feasible that, as has been
suggested with health taxes on particular products, such a measure could
be supported by subsidies to “healthy businesses,” helping to reduce the
likely opposition to such a scheme. For example, businesses that volun-
teered to stop selling tobacco and/or alcohol products could be offered
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a “healthy business” subsidy that would be funded by the tax on retail-
ers that continued to sell these products. Again, some detailed scenario
modeling of possible options would be required to examine this idea in
more detail. Such a measure could, in principle, be self-financing if the
revenue stream from the levy was hypothecated, in whole or in part, to
that purpose. At the very least, Scotland’s experience with the Public
Health Supplement provides a starting point for developing proposals
for policies intended to limit the availability of tobacco and alcohol
products (proposals that are likely to be of particular interest to those
working in contexts in which there appears to be an existing over-supply,
as is the case for Scotland in general, and deprived areas of Scotland in
particular.40)
Overall, our findings suggest that it would be worth considering a
future health tax of a similar design and level to the Supplement if the
objective is to raise revenue for health spending. If the objective is to
change retail behavior (eg, to encourage retailers to stop selling tobacco
products), then further research is required to ascertain the likely level
at which change would occur and also to better understand whether
retailer concerns about such a policy might be diminished by linking
the revenue to a “healthy retailer” subsidy.
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